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The Geosynchronous Orbit and the Outer
Limits of Westphalian Sovereignty
by NIMA NAYEBI*
There is no strife, no prejudice, no national conflict in outer
space as yet. Its hazards are hostile to us all. Its conquest
deserves the best of all mankind, and its opportunity for peaceful
cooperation many never come again.
- President John F. Kennedy**
I. Introduction
With the advent of new technologies, places that previously
seemed off limits to human exploration have at times become the
subjects of international tension. Just as maritime, and later, airspace
sovereignty issues spurred the development of sui generis regimes of
international law to govern their parameters, outer space is in need of
a strong international legal regime in order to avoid looming conflict
and disaster.' The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 provides that outer
space is the province of all humankind and is to be used for the
benefit of all countries.2 But as Professor Nina Tannewald points out,
"the current legal regime in space is increasingly fragmented and
* J.D. candidate, University of California Hastings College of the Law, 2011;
Production Editor, Hastings Law Journal. I would like to thank my wife Asya, my son
Alexander, my Dad, Mom, mother-in-law Gertrude, and my brother Navid for their
unconditional support. I would also like to thank Professor Sophie M. Clavier at San
Francisco State University and Professor Deborah A. Freund at Syracuse University for
their inspiration and dedication to excellence and scholarship.
** "Moon Speech," delivered at Rice Univ., Texas (Sep. 12, 1962), available at
http://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/ricetalk.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
1. "Regimes may be defined as a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules
and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given
area of international relations." STEPHEN D. KRASNER, Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 2 (Stephen
D. Krasner ed. New York, Cornell Univ. Press 1983).
2. See OGUNSOLA 0. OGUNBANWO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE
ACTIVITIES 63 (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 1975).
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inadequate to meet the challenges of the intensifying use of space."3
Indeed, the very positivist nature of international law weakens the
little adequacy that does exist in the current body of space law.4
One particular area of concern in the administration of outer
space is the allocation of highly desirable "real-estate" in the
geosynchronous orbit (GSO) among the various countries. This is
because the GSO is composed of a set of vantage points around the
Earth's equator from which satellites have the "best seat" to
communicate with the planet below.' Counting only satellites
officially indexed by the United Nations Office for Outer Space
Affairs (UNOOSA), there have been approximately 6,260 satellites
launched into space, beginning with the launch of the first human-
made satellite-Sputnik I-in 1957.6 Approximately 854 of these
satellites were positioned in geosynchronous orbit, and 516 are
currently active.
In recent years, "parking spots" in the geosynchronous orbit
have become an increasingly hot commodity.' According to the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 9 since the
3. Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-
Based Regime for Outer Space, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 363, 370 (2004).
4. International law is a consent-based system subservient to the sovereignty of
nation states. For a discussion of legal positivism and the positivist nature of international
law, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J.
INT'L L. 260 (1940), see also Michael Milde, Considerations on Legal Problems of Space
Above National Territory, 5 REV. OF CONTEMPORARY L. (Brussels) 5 (1958) (reprinted in
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF SPACE EXPLORATION: A SYMPosiuM 1102-31, 1102 (Washington
D.C., S. Comm. on Aeronautical & Space Sciences 1961)) (acknowledging that the
positivist nature of international law did not preclude the declaration of sovereignty over
outer space in the pre-UN era).
5. See T.S. Kelso, Basics of the GSO, SATELLITE TIMES (May 1998), http://
celestrak.com/columns/v04nO7/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
6. Soviet Fires Earth Satellite into Space; It is Circling the Globe at 18,000 M.P.H.;
Sphere Tracked in 4 Crossing Over U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1957, at 1.
7. As of March 2010, a total of 854 satellites in geosynchronous orbit have been
indexed by UNOOSA; 338 of these satellites have either decayed or have an unknown
functionality status. See UNOOSA, Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosalshowSearch.do (last visited Feb. 15, 2011). These
figures do not account for unreported objects.
8. See, e.g., Frederik Balfour, China Scores Major Coup in Satellite Space Race,
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/eyeonasia
/archives/2009/03/china scores ma.html.
9. NASA came into being through passage of the National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958 primarily as a response to the launch of Sputnik 1. 72 Stat. 426-38 (1958)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2452 (2006)). For a first-hand account of the creation
of NASA see Dr. Eilene Galloway, Sputnik and the Creation of NASA: A Personal
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launch of the first television satellite into a geosynchronous orbit in
1964, the number of objects in Earth's orbit has steadily increased to
over 200 new additions per year.'0 This increase was initially fueled
by the Cold War, during which space was a prime area of competition
between the United States and the Soviet Union." Yet over two
decades after the end of the US-Soviet space race, even the global
financial crisis that began in 2007 does not seem to have diminished
the demand for telecommunications satellites positioned in GSO.12
This ongoing scramble to place satellites in GSO prompted some
developing equatorial countries to assert sovereignty over the outer
space "above" their territorial borders," presumably with the hope of
extracting rent from the developed countries that circulate their
technologies overhead. So far, the international community has
rejected this notion, but the legal status of the GSO remains in
limbo.4
The inevitability of technological and scientific progress promises
a future full of challenges for space lawyers, who will ultimately be
responsible for the composition of (and adherence to) international
law in this new frontier. In this Note, I will explore a topic that may
initially seem like a plot out of Star Trek, but is very much real, and
will become even more relevant as humanity ventures farther from
home.
The question confronting us today is: who owns the GSO?
Arguably, our modern notions of sovereignty, as attributed to the
signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, have not been extended to
outer space, including the Moon and other "celestial bodies."" This is
partly because the inception of space law took place under the
auspices of the United Nations with the participation of new countries
that were former colonies, and partly because the technology needed
Perspective, 50TH MAGAZINE (Aug. 2007), available at http://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th
magazine/gallowayEsaay.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
10. For a graphic illustration, see NASA, Image of the Day, available at http://www.
nasa.gov/multimedialimagegallery/image-feature-1283.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
11. See generally DEBORAH CADBURY, SPACE RACE: THE EPIC BATTLE BETWEEN
AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION FOR DOMINION OF SPACE (N.Y., Harper Collins
2006).
12. The Satellite Industry Goes into Orbit, THE ECONOMIST (US) 64 (Oct. 10, 2009).
13. Lawrence D. Roberts, A Lost Connection: Geostationary Satellite Networks and
the International Telecommunication Union, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095, 1126 (2000).
14. NANDASIRI JASENTULIYANA, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW AND THE UNITED
NATIONS 2 (The Hague, Kluwer Law Int'l 1999).
15. For our purposes, "celestial bodies" are "all-natural" objects in space, not
including the Earth.
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to "conquer" space was novel at the time of this inception." In this
Note, I start in Part I analyzing some of the past and present
controversies surrounding the notion of sovereignty and its
application to the GSO. In Part II, I briefly discuss the origins of our
notion of sovereignty and its epidemic spread in the post-colonial era.
Part III explores our current space law regime, including the Outer
Space and Moon treaties. In Part IV, I address past and possible
future attempts to declare sovereignty over the geosynchronous orbit.
Part V, considers other territorial dominions of international law-
land, sea, air, and Antarctic law-since these are often cited as
analogies from which to construct a body of outer space law. Finally,
this Note argues that rather than determining the future of outer
space by analogy to our traditional notions of sovereignty, it is
beneficial to acknowledge that outer space is inherently different and
in need of its own sui generis legal regime.
II. Sovereignty: 1648 in Outer Space?
The familiar notion of the sovereign nation-state is commonly
attributed to the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648."
Since this notion was born in Europe, initially only the European
powers enjoyed their self-endowed sovereign status." These powers
declined to extend the privilege to their colonies and territories until
a wave of independence swept the globe during the 1960s and 70s.19
By then, the idea of sovereign nation-states with political
independence and territorial integrity took on the characteristic of jus
cogens, a peremptory norm of international law from which
derogation is not permitted, and that is equally applicable to all
*20countries.
16. See discussion infra, parts II & IV.
17. Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 20 (1948).
18. See Iver B. Neumann & Jennifer M. Welsh, The Other in European Self-
Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society, 17 REV. OF INT'L
STUDIES (Cambridge), 327, 338-39 (Oct. 1991).
19. In 1960, the United Nations helped to encourage the process of decolonization
with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
which called for "bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms
and manifestations . ... G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 15th Sess., 947th plen. mtg. (Dec. 14,
1960).
20. Ali Khan, The Extinction of Nation-States, 7 AM. U.J. L. & POL'Y 197, 198 (1992)
(internal citation omitted). Jus Cogens or peremptory norms are norms of international
law from which nation-states cannot deviate. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, 121 I.L.R. 213
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2002).
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International relations scholars often argue that these newly
independent countries have embraced the import of sovereignty even
more than their European originators.21 Indeed, during the wave of
independence, S. Prakash Sinha observed: "Sovereignty is the most
treasured possession of the newly independent States. On the one
hand, it makes them the master of their own house and, on the other
hand, it provides them with a legal shield against foreign incursions
[by] stronger States."22 The newly independent states have a strong
attachment to their sovereignty perhaps because it is all (or almost
all) they have in the wake of their post-colonial experience.
Certainly, the newly independent countries have sought to establish a
new international order-one in which their former silence is
replaced by input into the future of humankind.23
These countries have and continue to criticize the current body
of international law as "a product of relations among imperialist
States and of relations of an imperial character between imperialist
States and colonial peoples."2 4 Thus, it is in this unique context of
rapid technological development and the assumption of legal
personality by the former colonies that international space law has
developed, and it is in this environment that it continues to evolve.
During the early 1960s, before the existence of any international
space treaties, some commentators argued that the space directly
above a country's earthly territory is that country's sovereign space.
Professor Michael Milde of the Institute of Air and Space Law at
McGill University argued that "the principle of national sovereignty
over the space above national territory represents an ancient
principle firmly based on customary international law." 25 However,
the United Nations thought it otherwise when, through the Outer
Space Treaty of 1967, it prohibited the national appropriation of
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.26 But
even the Outer Space Treaty places objects and personnel launched
by state-parties under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the
launching country, essentially creating small pockets of sovereignty in
21. S. Prakash Sinha, Perspective of the Newly Independent States on the Binding
Quality of International Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. (Cambridge), 121, 127 (Jan. 1965).
22. Id.
23. See Id. at 121.
24. Id.
25. Milde, supra note 4.
26. See discussion infra Part Ill.A.
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outer space.27 In these "pockets" of sovereignty, countries can extend
their laws to protect, for instance, their intellectual property. For
example, American patent law applies onboard space vehicles over
which the United States has jurisdiction or control." What is evident
here is that the notion of state sovereignty is deeply rooted in the
global psyche, and as space law demonstrates, any attempt to deviate
from this norm will not be easy.
III. The Sputnik Regime
Although space law did not exist as such before the launch of
Sputnik I, there was already debate and conjecture over the legal
problems that could arise should humanity venture into outer space.
Vladimir Mandl, the father of space law, first published on the issue
in 1932, and Welf Heinrich, Prince of Hanover, submitted the first
doctor of laws thesis on space law in 1953.29 Countries such as
Germany, the United States, and the Soviet Union made progress in
the realm of space technology before World War II, but it was the
War itself that truly catalyzed the field.30 The visionary scholarship of
Mandl and Heinrich concerning outer space became a reality in 1957,
when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I.
27. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. VII, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter The Outer Space Treaty]. See also I.H.
PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & V. KOPAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO SPACE LAW 29 (The
Netherlands, Wolters Kluwer, 3d ed. 2008).
28. The US Patent Act provides:
Any invention made, used, or sold in outer space on a space object or component
thereof under the jurisdiction or control of the United States shall be considered
to be made, used or sold within the United States for the purposes of this title,
except with respect to any space object or component thereof that is specifically
identified and otherwise provided for by an international agreement to which the
United States is a party, or with respect to any space object or component
thereof that is carried on the registry of a foreign state in accordance with the
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.
35 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).
29. JASENTULIYANA, supra note 14.
30. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL,supra note 27, at 1.
31. See Kelso, supra note 5. The term "satellite" encompasses all objects orbiting a
planet. Some satellites such as the Moon are natural; the term "artificial" is used to
denote satellites launched into space by humans. See Artificial Satellite,
DICTiONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ArtificialSatellite (last visited
Feb. 15, 2011).
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The new global concern was reflected in the UN General
Assembly's establishment of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space ("UNCOPUOS"),3 2 whose goal is to "promote
energetically the fullest exploration and exploitation of outer space
for the benefit of mankind" in a peaceful manner and for peaceful
purposes." UNCOPUOS's role also includes investigating how
"space-related programs could be undertaken under [UN] auspices
and to study the legal problems that might arise from the exploration
and use of outer space." In 1961, a mere four years after the launch
of Sputnik I, Yuri Gagarin became the first man to complete a space
flight.35 By 1969 Neil Armstrong had left the first human footprints
on the lunar surface. It was in this climate of technological
explosion in the shadows of WWII, and in the midst of the Cold War,
that the international space regime came into being. According to
Professor John Hickman:
Fear gave birth to the international legal regime for outer space:
the ever-present fear of a nuclear war between the United
States and Soviet Union, the fear that either superpower would
achieve a decisive military technological advantage over the
other in outer space, the fear that competition for the best "real
estate" on celestial bodies might itself result in war between the
32. International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1472
(XIV), 14th Sess., 856th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/39 (Dec. 12, 1959).
33. Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), 13th Sess.,
792d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/4090 (13 Dec. 1958). The resolution called for an ad hoc
committee formed by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia,
France, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, the Soviet Union, the United
Arab Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States to study various issues that
may arise in outer space and to report their findings to the General Assembly. Id. at 1 1.
Among the issues to be studied were "[t]he future organizational arrangements to
facilitate international co-operation in [space] within the framework of the United
Nations . . ." and "[t]he nature of legal problems which may arise in the carrying out of
programmes to explore outer space . . . ." Id. at 1 1(c)-(d). The General Assembly
periodically adopts resolutions to reaffirm its goal of ensuring the peaceful use of outer
space, to which it has added the objective of sustainable development. See e.g,
International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 64/86, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/64/86 (Jan. 13, 2010).
34. STEPHEN GOROVE, Sources and Principles of Space Law, in SPACE LAW:
DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 45-58,46 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed., Praeger, 1992).
35. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 27.
36. Id.
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superpowers, and the fear that the superpowers might
37
cooperate in a duopoly over all of outer space.
The body of law that was born out of this mise-en-scene consists
of a series international treaties and agreements" overseen by
UNOOSA, which was formed in 1968 and had its origins in the 1958
UNCOPUOS Resolution.
From its seat in Vienna, UNOOSA's role is to implement the
decisions of the General Assembly and to discharge various
administrative functions, including maintenance of the "Register of
Objects Launched into Outer Space." 40 The most successful of the
space agreements (measured in terms of signatories) is the Outer
37. John Hickman, Still Crazy After Four Decades: The Case for Withdrawing From
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, THE SPACE REVIEW (Sep. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/960/1.
38. See generally UNOOSA, available at http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/
SpaceLaw/index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2011). The treaties and agreements are:
(1) The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, supra note 27 (98 ratifications and 27
signatures);
(2) Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19.6 U.S.T. 7570,
672 U.N.T.S. 120 (90 ratifications, 24 signatures, and 1 acceptance of rights and
obligations) [hereinafter the Rescue Agreement];
(3) Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24.2 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (86 ratifications, 24 signatures,
and 3 acceptances of rights and obligations) [hereinafter the Liability
Convention];
(4) Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14,
1975, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (25 signatures and 54 Parties) [hereinafter the Registration
Convention];
(5) Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 (14 ratifications and 11
signatures) [hereinafter the Moon Agreement].
39. International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1472
(XIV), 14th Sess., 856th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/39 (Dec. 12, 1959).
40. See generally UNOOSA, supra note 38. The agency's other functions include
"assisting developing countries in using space technology for development" and following
"legal, scientific and technical developments relating to space activities, technology and
applications in order to provide technical information and advice to Member States,
international organizations and other United Nations offices." Id. These functions were
outlined in the Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
Annex. G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2280th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/9620 (Nov. 12, 1974). Since December of 2007, UNOOSA is directed by Ms. Mazlan
Othman, of Malaysia. The agency and has two sections: the Space Application Section
and Committee Services and Research Section. http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosalen/
OOSA/index.html.
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Space Treaty,41 while the least accepted is the Moon Agreement of
1979.42 There has been much debate over whether space law is a
separate branch of international law or whether it is an extension of
air law, especially since the boundary between outer space and the air
has yet to be defined.43 In other words, today it is legally uncertain
where the sky ends and outer space begins." Nonetheless, as
Professor I. H. Ph. Diederikus-Verschoor has argued, this debate is
largely moot now because space law is "manifestly distinctive from air
law which governs the airspace and the law of the sea which is
concerned with the seas and the oceans." 45 As the newest branch of
international law operating within the Westphalian regime of
sovereign countries, the common threads in space law to date have
been the "maintenance of international peace and security and the
promotion of international co-operation and understanding," and
deviation from national sovereignty46 as evidenced by the Outer
Space Treaty of 1967 and the Moon Agreement. These agreements
are most relevant to the topic of territorial sovereignty-or lack
thereof - in outer space, so let us explore each in turn.
A. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967
Proclaimed the "Magna Carta of international space law,"41
ninety-eight countries, including the U.S., Russia, and most of Europe
have signed and ratified the Outer Space Treaty as of 2011.48 A chief
accomplishment of the Treaty is the establishment of a regime for
freedom of exploration, and free access to the celestial bodies, but
this freedom is in fact limited by a number of the Treaty's
provisions. 49 Before considering the Outer Space Treaty further, it is
helpful to list some of its core principles:
41. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, supra note 27.
42. The Moon Agreement, supra note 38.
43. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 27.
44. Id.
45. Id.; see discussion infra, part III.A.
46. JASENTULIYANA, supra note 14.
47. GOROVE, supra note 34.
48. UNOOSA, Treaty Status Index, available at http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa
tdb/showTreatySignatures.do (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
49. GOROVE, supra note 34.
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(1) The exploration of outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies shall be carried out for the benefit and in
the interest of all countries.
(2) Outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all
states on a basis of equality.
(3) Outer space shall not be subject to appropriation by claim
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means.
(4) Activities in the exploration and use of outer space must be
carried out in accordance with international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining
peace and security.
(5) No nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction shall be ... placed in orbit around the Earth.
(10) State Parties on whose registries the space objects are
carried keep jurisdiction and control over such objects and the
personnel thereof recorded in their registries.o
Article I of the Treaty requires that exploration, while free,
"shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development, and shall be the province of all mankind.""' Article I
also requires that space exploration be conducted on an equal footing
without discriminating against countries.52 In a significant break with
the Westphalian regime, Article II prohibits the appropriation of the
Moon and other celestial bodies by any one country, either through
claims of sovereignty or through use or occupation.53 Diederiks-
Verschoor and Kopal characterize this ban as "an absolute legal
barrier in the realization of every kind of space activity."4 This is in
sharp contrast to air law and the law of the sea, which embrace the
construct of national sovereignty." The Treaty also bans the
placement of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in
Earth's orbit, on the celestial bodies, or anywhere else in outer
50. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 27, at 24.
51. G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6431 (Dec. 19,1966).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 27, at 26.
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space." Article V declares that astronauts are "envoys of mankind"
and must be aided by other countries when in distress." In other
relevant articles, the Treaty holds launching countries liable for
damage caused by their space objects" and imposes a duty to avoid
"harmful contamination" of the Earth's environment by the
introduction of extraterrestrial substances. 9
It is important to note that the Outer Space Treaty applies only
to countries and does not directly apply to non-state entities such as
corporations. This is because the assumption that only states or
government-supported organizations are capable of mustering the
resources needed to navigate space is one of the "salient" features of
space law as it stands today.' Such an assumption has made space
law largely "conventional;" that is, it has consisted of "rules laid down
in international conventions, treaties, accords, or whatever other title
international agreements may carry."6 ' Article VI holds national
governments directly responsible for supervising and approving the
activities of their respective non-governmental entities.62  These
general principles established in the Outer Space Treaty have been
subject to elaboration and legal evolution in subsequent international
agreements. The last and least successful of these is the Moon
Agreement.
B. The Moon Agreement of 1979
The primary force behind the Moon Agreement was a well-
intentioned desire to elaborate on the body of space law established
by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.63 Perhaps the best-known and
most successful contribution of space law to international law is the
56. G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), art. V, U.N. Doc. A/6431 (19 Dec. 19, 1966).
57. G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), art. V, U.N. Doc. A/643.
58. Id. at art. VII. Articles VII and VIIl outline a set of rules on liability for damage
caused by space objects and jurisdictional issues. These rules were elaborated by later
international Conventions. See the Liability Convention and the Registration Convention,
supra note 38.
59. Id. at art. IX.
60. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 27, at 23.
61. Id.; see generally C.Q. Christol, The Moon Treaty and the Allocation of Resources,
XXII-II ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 31, 31-52 (1997).
62. The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 38, at art. VI.
63. Francis Lyall, On the Moon, 26 J. SPACE L. 129,132 (1998).
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concept of the "common heritage of [hu]mankind,"6 which appears
for the first time in the Moon Treaty." This notion, which was
originally introduced to the international polity during the 1967
negotiations on outer space by the Argentine and Maltan
ambassadors to the UN," is now enshrined in the Moon Treaty,7 and
its use has increased exponentially in international agreements-
especially in those having to do with the environment."
Traditionally, international law divided the world into national
territory, or res nullius (areas which may be appropriated as national
territory), and res extra commercium (areas which may not be
appropriated as national territory). The areas not subject to national
appropriation-the high seas, the sea bed, Antarctica, and outer
space-are commonly referred to as the global commons.69 The
common heritage of humankind added a fourth dimension to the
status quo by creating a category for areas which not only may not be
appropriated as national territory, "but the fruits and resources of
which are also deemed to be the property of [hu]mankind at large."0
In addition to requiring the international management of resources
through international cooperation, the most controversial aspect of
this doctrine has been the mandate that benefits derived from the use
and exploitation of natural resources in common heritage areas (such
as the Moon) must be shared among all countries." Realizing that
"they do not command the technology to take advantage of resources
in these hard-to-reach places," developing countries place emphasis
on this provision as a means for the equitable allocation of benefits
derived from our common heritage.72
64. The term as used in the Moon Agreement is "common heritage of mankind." I
substitute "mankind" with the more gender-neutral term "humankind" throughout this
Note.
65. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 27, at 50.
66. JASENTULIYANA, supra note 14.
67. The Moon Treaty, supra note 38, Art. 11(1) (stating, "[t]he moon and its natural
resources are the common heritage of mankind .... ")
68. See e.g., KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF
MANKIND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-05 (The Netherlands, Kluwer Law Int'l 1998).
69. DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 482 (3d ed., N.Y., Foundation Press 2007).
70. BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 357 (Oxford, Clarendon
Press 1997).
71. Id. at 358.
72. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 69.
[Vol. 3:2
The Moon Treaty declares: "The Moon and its natural resources
are the common heritage of [hu]mankind, which finds its expression
in the provisions of this Agreement, in particular in paragraph 5 of
this article."" Paragraph 5 in turn calls for the establishment of an
international management regime "to govern the exploitation of the
natural resources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to
become feasible."74 This paradigm, which does not extend to the
GSO, was one of the principal reasons behind the Moon Agreement's
failure."
The Moon Agreement encountered a great deal of controversy
at the UN, causing particular tension over the issue of lunar
resources." The trouble with the common heritage doctrine is its
quality as a resource sharing principle. It goes far beyond the non-
appropriation principle of the Outer Space Treaty, calling for the
allocation of profits from space amongst all UN member countries in
"what might be termed 'dividing the pie."" While the impetus of the
developing countries is to benefit from the common heritage concept,
the conflicting concern of the developed countries might be termed
"collecting the apples that go into the pie." 8 It was this conflict over
the common heritage doctrine that caused the Moon Agreement to
become a peripheral agreement of little importance. This last attempt
at refining the Outer Space Treaty was not ratified by a single space-
faring country,79 and irrespective of this, it did nothing to clarify the
status of open space or the GSO under international law.0 Indeed, it
is difficult to conceive that any space-capable country will ever
subscribe to the common heritage doctrine and that this doctrine will
ever apply to the GSO. Countries that invest in research,
development, and deployment of spacecraft will not realistically want
to share the fruits of their labour with the rest of the world. It is also
probable that this doctrine-if accepted-would make space
73. The Moon Treaty, supra note 38, art. 11(1). The Agreement extends the
definition of the Moon to include all celestial bodies other than the Earth. See BIN
CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 374 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1997).
74. Id. at art. 11(5).
75. See e.g. Lyall, supra note 63.
76. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 27, at 51.
77. GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES 135 (Boulder, Colo.,
Westview Press 1997).
78. Id.
79. UNOOSA, Treaty Signatures, available at http://www.oosa.unvienna.orgloosatdb
/showTreatySignatures.do.
80. See The Moon Agreement, supra note 33.
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exploration less profitable, removing at least some of the motivation
for venturing out beyond planet Earth. Scott Shackelford has
proposed that a viable alterative is to grant countries limited property
rights in the common heritage realms so that they have an incentive
for investment in the exploitation of these resources.8 ' This
proposition echoes what is already a provision of the Outer Space
Treaty: Article VIII's grant of jurisdiction and control of spacecraft
and objects constructed on a celestial body to the launching state.
The problem with such a proposition is that countries that are not
space-capable would likely be unable to partake in this grant of
limited sovereignty (or property rights). Had the UN drafted a
different treaty, one that declared open space and the GSO common
heritages of humankind, the concept may have had a better prospect
of gaining international acceptance because, afterall, the issue of
resource extraction from empty space is not likely to be controversial.
Such a treaty may have at least indirectly alleviated some of the
concerns over ownership of the GSO by clarifying its status under
international law as a common heritage of humankind. This would
have made no practical difference since there is (as yet) no resource
extraction from empty space, and geosynchronous satellites and their
benefits would remain with the launching states. Such a provision
may have, however, paved the way for later inclusion of the common
heritage doctrine in documents such as the Moon Agreement.
We have arguably established that the GSO is not a common
heritage of humankind, but that it is res extra commercium under the
current international legal regime."' One might logically think that
(with the exception of Article VIII jurisdiction and control rights) no
country may appropriate any portion of the GSO; still, the lack of a
definite boundary between air and space leaves open a large loophole
that may yet provide an avenue for national appropriation of the
GSO.
81. Scott J. Shackelford, The Tragedy of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 27 STAN.
ENv. L.J. 101, 110 (2008).
82. "A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer
space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any
personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects
launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and
of their component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial
body or by their return to the Earth . . . ." The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 27, at art.
VII.
83. Neither the Moon Agreement nor any other international agreement declares the
geosynchronous orbit a common heritage area.
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IV. Sovereignty over the GSO?
The GSO is the orbit around the Earth's equator at an altitude of
approximately 35,785 km (22,236 miles); the orbit takes twenty-four
hours to complete." From this position, an orbiting satellite can "see"
about one third of the planet's surface at a time." According to
NASA, this altitude allows for a "broad view" that, when combined
with "the ability to hover over a single equatorial location," has made
the GSO very popular for communications relay and weather
monitoring spacecraft." Satellites in the GSO that appear to remain
stationary in the sky when viewed from the ground are called
"geostationary."" This is an especially desirable position for
telecommunications satellites since they can maintain a constant link
with their contact point on the Earth from these parking spots."
89Satellite communications is an immensely profitable enterprise.
There is a long queue for access to the GSO, comprised of
"companies proposing new services (such as direct-to-home broadcast
television and mobile communications for trucking or airline fleets)
and representing newcomers, particularly developing countries, now
entering the market for satellite services."" This queue is
administered by the Space Services Department of the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) under the auspices of the UN. 91
It is no surprise, then, that the "commodification" of these
vantage points in space and their relative allocation among the
84. NASA, What is a Geosynchronous Orbit, available at http://www.gsfc.nasa.gov/
gsfc/educ/fyeo/faq/gorbit.htm
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral Inc., 249 F.3d 1314, 1316 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
88. Id.
89. Francis Lyall, Law of Satellite Communications, in SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT
AND SCOPE 114-25,123 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed., Praeger, 1992).
90. Thomas Gangale, Who Owns the GEO?, 31 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 425, 427
(2006) (quoting Molly K. Macauley, Allocation of Orbit and Spectrum Resources for
Regional Communications: What's at Stake?, Resource for the Future, Discussion Paper
98-10, (Dec. 1, 1997), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-98-10.pdf (last
visited Feb. 15, 2011)).
91. Founded in 1865, the ITU is based in Geneva and headed by Secretary General
Dr Hamadoun 1. Tour6. See ITU, available at http://www.itu.int/netlaboutlindex.aspx (last
visited Feb. 15, 2011). For further discussion of the ITU, see Yvon Henri, Long-Term
Efficiency of the Space Regulatory Framework, available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-R/
information/promotion/e-flash/2/article6.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
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various countries is a point of international dispute.' Even the
drawing of a boundary between the air and outer space has been
controversial because the classification could potentially push the
GSO into the province of air law rather than space law. Imposition of
an internationally recognized, definitive boundary between air and
space could cause a shift in the treaties applicable to the GSO.3 You
will recall that the basic premise of space law is to promote the
exploration and exploitation of outer space for the benefit of
humankind, free from the normative notion of sovereignty.4 This
proposition is rather different from that of air law, which (like the law
of the sea) is based on the Westphalian model of sovereign nation-
states. The Paris Convention of 1919 on international air law was
premised on the idea that "[p]arties recognize that every Power has
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its
territory."5 Exclusive sovereignty over airspace is now the norm, and
has been codified by many countries: in 1920, for example, the United
Kingdom Parliament declared, "[t]he full and absolute sovereignty
and rightful jurisdiction of His Majesty extends, and has always
extended, over the air."96 Similarly, in 1957 the US Congress declared
that "[t]he United States Government has exclusive sovereignty of
the airspace of the United States."" For our purposes, we will think
of the GSO as part of space rather than the air," but some countries
have already (and may again) challenge this definition and attempt to
assert sovereignty over the GSO as their "territorial outerspace"
under international air law.9
A. The Bogoti 8
Controversy over ownership rights and sovereignty over this
finite space resource has not been entirely lacking. Up to now, the
United States, Russia, and a few other developed countries have
92. See MARIETTA BENKO, ET AL., SPACE LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONS 137-38
(The Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff Pubishers 1985).
93. See JASENTULIYANA, supra note 14.
94. See e.g., G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), supra note 33.
95. MICHAEL MILDE, International Air Law and ICAO, in ESSENTIAL AIR AND
SPACE LAW 11 (Marietta Benko ed., Vol. 4, The Netherlands, Eleven Int'l, 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
96. Air Navigation Act, 1920, 1 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 80, Preamble (U.K.).
97. 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2006).
98. See discussion, infra, part IV.
99. See Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, Dec. 3, 1976, ITU
Doc. WARC-BS-81-E.
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enjoyed the most "space" in the GSO."0 The U.S. has about 339
satellites in the GSO,' six of which, for example, served DirecTV
satellite television company as of 2004.'0 During the decolonization
wave of the 1970s, developing countries became cognizant that their
former colonizers' use of the GSO for telecommunications could
hinder their ability to access this resource in the future. 103 Lawrence
D. Roberts writes that, "[o]f even greater concern to the developing
states were the uses to which communication technologies were being
put. Distribution of news and other information to developing
populations was perceived as former colonial powers foisting
inappropriate and dangerous perceptions and values on the citizens of
developing states."" In other words, the former colonies were
foreshadowing the threat to their sovereignty by Western cultural
imperialism, which has now ironically become an established by-
product of globalization.o10
By 1976, a group of eight equatorial countries led by Colombia
(the "BogotA 8") sought to secure the rights to the geostationary
positions directly over their territories'0 by extending their
sovereignty to "outerspace."0' The 1976 Bogotd Declaration
encapsulated their aspirations, though it was difficult for the
equatorial group to make their claim of sovereignty given the Outer
Space Treaty's express abrogation of national sovereignty over outer
space.t os A further problem was that since none of the Bogota 8
countries were space-capable at the time, a legal violation of the
Outer Space Treaty on their part would have probably prompted the
space-faring countries to take advantage of the opportunity and assert
100. Roberts, supra note 13, at 1125.
101. Index, UNOOSA, available at http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/showSearch.do
(last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
102. Directv, Inc. v. Morris, 357 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
103. Roberts, supra note 13.
104. Id.
105. "Since decolonization, the principle of radiation outward from an imperial center
has retained its structure, but changed its meaning from positive to negative . . . ." JAN
NEDERVEEN PIETERSE, GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE: GLOBAL MLANGE 59
(Maryland, Rowman & Littlefiled 2009).
106. Roberts, supra note 13, at 1126.
107. The eight countries were Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya,
Uganda, and Zaire. Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, Dec. 3,
1976, ITU Doc. WARC-BS-81-E; reproduced in 6 J. SPACE L. 193-96 (1978) [hereinafter
Bogotd Declaration].
108. See The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 27 and Part III.A and accompanying
notes.
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their own claims of sovereign rights over other parts of space.1ta To
elude this possibility, the group of eight argued for a special exception
for the GSO:
Reasoning that the orbital arcs above each declaring nation
were fixed, the declarants argued that those arcs should not be
considered a part of outer space at all, but rather should be
considered a natural resource arising directly out of terrestrial
gravitational phenomena. Since each nation has a right of
control over its own natural resources, they argued, the portions
of geostationary arc should be controlled by those nations
having territory directly underneath."o
As discussed earlier, commentators have long pointed to a
loophole in the Outer Space Treaty caused by the lack of a clear line
of demarcation between airspace and outer space. The Bogotd 8's
argument that the GSO arises directly from the Earth's gravity
implied that everything that lies in Earth's gravitational field is
airspace and hence should not be governed by space law but rather by
air law."' This reasoning allowed the Bogota 8 to make claims of
sovereignty without contravening international law, and without
prompting space-capable countries to follow suit. In the Bogota
Declaration of 1976, the equatorial countries asserted that the
placement of satellites in their respective portions of the GSO
required "express authorization on the part of the concerned State." 1 2
The Bogota 8 restated their claims to geostationary sovereignty at the
1977 World Radio Conference held in Geneva, Switzerland, and later
that same year at the UN Outer Space Legal Subcommittee.'13 In a
statement by the Colombian delegate E. Gaviria, the group
maintained that their proclamation of sovereignty over their
respective segments of the GSO was not in conflict with the Outer
Space Treaty and that this Treaty "did not take account of the
109. See Roberts, supra note 13, at 1126.
110. Id. (internal citations omitted).
111. Lieutenant Colonel Patrick W. Franzese, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can It Exist,
64 A.F. L. REV. 1, 26 (2009). The current rule of thumb is that a country's airspace ends
and outer space begins at the lowest altitude where a satellite "can continually remain in
orbit without disintegrating." DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
FRAMEWORKS 121 (2d ed. 2006).
112. Bogotd Declaration, supra note 107.
113. Andrej Gorbiel, The Legal Status of GSO: Some Remarks, 6 J. SPACE L. 171, 174
(1978).
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interests of developing countries.", 4 During the meeting, Kenyan
delegate J. Simani pointed to the need for a definition of the
boundary between the air and space that was sensitive to "the special
position of equatorial countries with respect to the GSO forming part
of their natural resources."" Essentially, Mr. Simani argued that the
GSO should be considered a part of airspace, and hence, immune
from the Outer Space Treaty regime.
Not surprisingly, the equatorial countries' arguments did not go
over well at the Outer Space Legal Subcommittee. The Soviet
delegate, Mr. B.G. Maiorski, argued that the GSO was part of outer
space and that the coincidental location of the equatorial countries
did not create any rights in the orbit."'6 In the end, the overwhelming
consensus at the Subcommittee was that claims of sovereignty over
the GSO or any other part of outer space are incompatible with the
express and implied spirit of the Outer Space Treaty and should be
dismissed."7 However, to deflate the situation and bring temporary
resolution to the issue, the ITU agreed to set aside certain GSO
"parking spaces" for future use by non-space-faring countries."
Nonetheless, the question of whether the GSO is part of outer
space or the air remains unanswered. Professor Andrej Gorbiel, who
was the Polish delegate at the Outer Space Legal Subcommittee in
1977, has written that the main objective of the Outer Space Treaty
was to promulgate rules to govern the activities of countries in their
outer space adventures."9 He argues:
[t]his use encompasses objects launched into outer space and in
particular artificial earth satellites placed in orbit around the
earth. Therefore, the implementation of the [Outer Space
Treaty] is possible on the assumption that its provisions concern
those regions of space in which the . . . satellites are placed.12
114. Gorbiel, supra note 113, at 174 (quoting ITU Doc. 266/Rev. 1/-E (1977)).
115. Gorbiel, supra note 113, at 175 (quoting U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.277 at 2
(1977)).
116. Id.
117. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 27, at 100.
118. ITU Radiocommunication Regional Conference, Orbit/Spectrum Allocation
Procedures Registration Mechanism, (Abu Dhabi Apr. 22-26, 2007) (on file with author).
119. Gorbiel, supra note 113, at 177.
120. Id.
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Gorbiel concludes that to argue otherwise would deprive the
Outer Space Treaty of the reason for its existence.121 In 2001, at its
44th session, UNCOPUOS agreed that "[t]he GSO, characterized by
its special properties, is part of outer space."12 2 In line with our
assumption that space law governs the GSO, it would seem that, thus
far at least, the orbit is immunized from dissection by equatorial
sovereigns.
B. The BogotA _ _ ?'m
You may question the relevance of the events of 1976 in today's
rapidly changing world, but the issue of the ownership of the GSO is
not likely to fade away anytime soon. While from a Western
perspective the failure of the BogotA 8 to garner support for their
Declaration may appear to be in the best interest of humanity, the
current system lacks an element of fairness for the developing world.
In this sense, the Bogoti Declaration may be thought of as not only a
demand for sovereignty over portions of the GSO, but as a symbolic
disapproval of the current "first come, first served" 24 arrangement in
space, where wealthy countries disproportionately enjoy the benefits
of new space technologies.125
At present, developing countries are more reliant on
telecommunications satellites than the developed world because they
have limited telephone networks and less infrastructure. 6 Wealthier
countries, on the other hand, have an abundance of networks that
serve their robust mobile telephone and broadband Internet markets.
These services are delivered mainly via less expensive low Earth orbit
satellites and terrestrial networks rather than geostationary sources.127
121. Id.
122. U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [UNCOPUOS] Report, U.N.
GAOR, 56th sess., Supp. No. 20/A/56/20/, $126 (2001).
123. This blank denotes an unknown future number of countries.
124. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL,supra note 27, at 21.
125. The "first come, first served" arrangement is an extension of the Anglo-American
"first-in-time, first-in-right" property rule. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1805). "Under such a rule, all other things being equal, the chronologically first possessor
has the better title." D. BARLOW BURKE & JOSEPH SNOE, EXAMPLES &
EXPLANATIONS: PROPERTY 16-17 (3d ed. 2008).
126. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 12.
127. See id. Low Earth Orbit or LEO is a satellite orbit that is 100 to 1,000 nautical
miles . . . above the surface of the Earth in contrast to the 22,236 miles of altitude needed
to achieve a geosynchronous orbit. James L. Reed, The Commercial Space Launch
Market and Bilateral Trade Agreements in Space Launch Services, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
157, 173 n.93 (1997).
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As demand for information services increases in developing
countries, the spirit of the BogotA Declaration is likely to linger.
In 1991, Colombia, the principal actor of the Bogotd 8,
promulgated its new constitution. In defiance of international law,
article 101 sets out the regions over which Colombia enjoys
sovereignty. Paragraph 4 of the article reads:
Also part of Colombia is the subsoil, the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the continental shelf, the exclusive econ-omic
zone, the airspace, the segment of the GSO, the electromagnetic
spectrum and the space in which it operates, in accordance with
international law or the laws of Colombia in the absence of
international regulations.28
This constitutional declaration illustrates that Colombia still
disputes the existence of international regulations applicable to the
GSO or, that the GSO falls within the ambit of the Outer Space
Treaty. This assertion enables Colombia to claim that its declaration
of sovereignty over the GSO is "in accordance with international
law. ,129
Arguably, it is not just developing countries that wish to acquire
territorial rights in the space above their land. Despite having ratified
the Outer Space Treaty in 1983,130 an "increasing number of
publications by influential Chinese authors (are) advancing the
principle that China's sovereignty extends through outer space,"
reasoning that there is still no legal line of demarcation that would
prevent such an extension. 13 1 With the continuing classification of the
GSO as res extra commercium and the resulting advantage to wealthy
space-faring countries, it is likely that the BogotA 8 will grow and
make a comeback as the BogotA _ _ _. Thomas Gangale argues that
many "entities have contracted with [satellite] launching States to
128. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA art. 101 14 (emphasis added).
Unofficial translation available at http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/colombia
const2.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
129. Id.
130. UNOOSA, Treaty Signatures, supra note 79.
131. See Franzese, supra note 111 (quoting Peter A. Dutton, China's Views of
Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic
& Security Review Commission, (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings
/2008hearings/written testimonies/08_02_27_wrts/08_02_27_duttonstatement.php)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
131. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 12.
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place their own satellites in the [GSO], and this number will only
grow as more States develop the need for positions in the [orbit]." 32
However, if countries must rely on a contractual relationship to
benefit from satellite technology, this may exacerbate access and
sovereignty issues in relation to the GSO, and may be viewed as a
form of space neocolonialism. To avoid this scenario, it is necessary
to find an alternative classification for the GSO.
IV. Analogies to Other Territorial Norms
Freedom of the seas, or rather the ownership of the seas, has
been a topic of discussion since antiquity.'33 In the pre-Christian era,
freedom of the seas posed problems for interstate politics, but it was
not yet "a matter of formal international law."1 3 4 Today, the Law of
the Sea is a well-developed branch of international law. To this, we
have added Air Law, as well as an Antarctic regime. These separate
branches of international law are often used as the rationales for
arguments for or against sovereignty in outer space. According to
Lieutenant Colonel Patrick W. Franzese, during the initial
development of international sea and air law there were calls for
establishing sovereignty-free regimes, but "state interests, such as
trade and national security, combined with a state's technological
capabilities, ultimately prevailed over these arguments and
determined the current legal status of these domains.""3 In the
following sections, we shall look briefly at these bodies of law because
they have each confronted the issue of national sovereignty and they
provide insight into various possible "ownership" avenues for the
GSO.136
A. The Land Analogy
Thomas Gangale asks: "[c]ould segments of the [GSO] above the
territories of the equatorial states be considered as analogous to land,
and therefore subject to territorial claim?"137 He argues that the
132. Gangale, supra note 90, at 445-46.
133. See PITMAN B. POTTER, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEA IN HISTORY, LAW, AND
POLITICS 11-35 (Buffalo N.Y., Hein, 2002).
134. Id. at 35.
135. Franzese, supra note 111, at 29.
136. One disclaimer is in order here: the following discussion presents a very basic
picture of other areas of territorial law as relevant to the topic of this Paper. This
discussion should not be construed as comprehensive.
137. Gangale, supra note 90, at 432-33.
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answer is "no," because the equatorial countries neither "discovered"
nor were the first to "possess," "use," or "occupy" the orbit, as
required by traditional modes of acquisition of land.' What's more,
land is a physical phenomenon whereas outer space and the GSO lack
physicality. The land analogy therefore seems farfetched.
B. The Sea Analogy
Much like space law, the Law of the Sea establishes the "high
seas" as res communis'" or res extra commericium with "equality of
access for all nations."'" While the high seas are often thought of in
terms of their commercial value (mineral extraction, fishing, etc.),
outer space is thought of as having mostly military value-and more
recently-communications value. 141 Despite these differences, many
concepts from the Law of the Sea ("freedom of use, access,
registration, etc.")142 are now a part of the outer space regime. Yet
the Law of the Sea does grant sovereignty to states in the form of
territorial waters and exclusive economic zones.'43 Can we draw an
analogy between territorial waters or exclusive economic zones and
the GSO? Gangale rightly argues that sovereignty over territorial
waters and exclusive economic zones assumes and requires contiguity
to the territory of a country, and the 35,785 km (22,236 miles)
between terrestrial land and the GSO can hardly satisfy this
requirement.'"
C. The Air Analogy
As discussed in Part IV, the question of the boundary between
air and space is a controversial and unresolved issue.145  This is
significant because the two bodies of law have markedly different
138. Gangale, supra note 90, at 433-35.
139. Defined as "things that cannot be owned or appropriated, such as light, air, and
the sea." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1333 (8th ed., West 2004).
140. S. HOUSTON LAY & HOWARD J. TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING TO
ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE 57 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1970). See United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Nov. 16, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3,
art. 87-89 (stating, "[n]o State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its
sovereignty" and "[t]hese freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas ....
141. Id.
142. Id. at 59.
143. See 1836 U.N.T.S. 3 parts II & V.
144. Gangale, supra note 90, at 435-36.
145. See discussion supra, part IV.
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approaches to sovereignty. You will recall that under air law, every
country "has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace
above its territory"'" but under outer space law there is no similar
national sovereignty.'47 The problem is that these two distinct bodies
of law have no clear line of demarcation; neither air law nor outer
space law demarcate a specific height at which the air ends and space
begins.48 In practice, countries regard an area up to 30 kilometers
(18.6 miles) above their territory as their sovereign airspace.149 The
Equatorial countries never claimed sovereignty over the space
between that 30 km zone and the GSO, so there is a gap and a break
in contiguity between their airspace and the GSO. Gangale argues
that because of this, "the analogy to airspace does not fly."
Additionally, UNCOPUOS has agreed that the GSO is part of outer
space,so and its discussion of airspace has generally been restricted to
a height of 90 to 110 km (56 to 68 miles) above Earth.'
D. The Antarctic Analogy
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty states "Antarctica shall be used for
peaceful purposes only," 5 2 but does not recognize nor dispute any
territorial claims over Antarctica. 5 3 Article IV paragraph 4 of the
Treaty provides that "[n]o new claim, or enlargement of an existing
claim, to territorial sovereignty shall be asserted while the present
Treaty is in force."54 Attempts by countries to lay new claims to the
GSO by analogy to the Antarctica Treaty are thus expressly
prohibited-at least while the Treaty it is in force-and therefore fail.
146. See Milde, supra note 95 and accompanying text.
147. See supra part III.A.
148. Id.
149. See Gangale, supra note 90, 437-38.
150. See UNCOPUOS supra, note 119 and accompanying text.
151. See Gangale, supra note 90, at 437.
152. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959,12.1 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S 71 art. I.
153. Id. at art. IV. 11-2.
154. Id. at art. IV. 2.
[Vol. 3:2
E. A Summary
The table below sets forth the sovereignty stances of four
different areas of international law.55
Law Principles Norms Source/
Administration
Sea 56  The high seas The sovereignty of a Law of the Sea &
should be open coastal country International
to every extends beyond its Tribunal for the
country, land and internal Law of the Sea
although waters
countries have
valid territorial
interests
beyond their
coasts
Air'57  The air above a Every state has Chicago
country is part complete exclusive Convention &
of the territory sovereignty over the International Civil
of the airspace above its Aviation
underlying territory Organization
country
Antarctica' Antarctica is to No recognition, Antarctic Treaty
be used for dispute, or System
peaceful and establishment of Antarctic Treaty
scientific national sovereignty, Secretariat
purposes but new claims of
sovereignty may not
be asserted
Outer Outer space is Outer space, including Outer Space
Space' the province of the Moon and the Treaty &
all humankind celestial bodies are Committee on the
immune from national Peaceful Uses of
appropriation Outer Space
155. Reproduced partly from Franzese, supra note 111, at 27.
156. See e.g., R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA (3d ed.
Manchester Univ. Press 1999).
157. See e.g., I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION To AIR LAW (8th
ed. Brussels, Kluwer L. Int'l 2006).
158. The Antarctic Treaty art. IV, Dec. 1, 1959, 12.1 U.S.T. 794, 796,402 U.N.T.S. 71.
159. See discussion supra part III and accompanying notes.
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Because the technological capabilities of states in relation to
space remain in their infancy, it is probable that space law will evolve
to accommodate change. However, arguments for changing
sovereignty over the GSO by analogy to current bodies of
international law is both difficult and logically flawed. Such
arguments conflict with technological development in less developed
countries because they restrict the orbit to the current space-faring
countries. Rather than attempting to determine the ownership of the
GSO by analogizing to traditional notions of national sovereignty, we
should acknowledge that outer space is a new human venture that
needs its own sui generis legal regime. An alternative system-a
system in which national sovereignty is not the core norm-has the
potential of promoting unity among human beings and may
ultimately provide us with an alternative to our arguably outmoded
Westphalian system of sovereign and separate nation-states.
I do not propose a specific system for the fair administration of
the GSO, nor do I advocate a sovereignty-free GSO for the benefit of
current space-faring countries. I only suggest that the notion of a
world divided in piecemeal fashion among various countries is not the
only-nor the best-guideline for establishing an outer space regime.
I do not advocate a chimerical idealism-for we all face the many
inescapable realities of the world-but outer space is an opportunity
for humankind to establish new realities and new legal regimes.
Attempts by the BogotAi 8 to extend national sovereignty into outer
space not only undermine the Outer Space Treaty's prohibition of
sovereignty, but also undermine the possibility of a gradual shift away
from nationalism and toward supranational solutions.
V. Conclusion
Starting with Sputnik I in 1957, technology has progressed
rapidly. The first human beings landed on the Moon in 1971, and an
unmanned spacecraft landed on Venus that same year.'6 0 Dennis
Tito, the first space tourist, blasted off from Earth in a Russian Soyuz
rocket in 2001.16' Today, a myriad of Earth objects circulate in space
and the International Space Station is under construction in low
160. See J.E.S. Fawcett, Outer Space: New Challenges to Law and Policy 115 (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1984).
161. First Space Tourist: Dennis Tito's Flight to Station Alpha, SPACE.COM, http://www.
space.com/dennistito/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
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Earth orbit.162 Despite these accomplishments, humanity has not yet
achieved the level of space sophistication that would make the
promulgation of a definitive body of international outer space law an
urgent necessity. As the exploration of outer space intensifies,
however, lawyers and politicians have the opportunity to create a
relatively novel body of law with the benefit of historical hindsight.
In a more advanced future space age, it is feasible that our
Westphalian model of sovereignty will eventually be outmoded,
although such a development is difficult to fathom from our own
early twenty-first century perspective.
In 1795, Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote, "the right
to the earth's surface ... belongs to the human race in common," and
envisioned that through increased contact between the peoples of the
various countries, the Earth will eventually enjoy a "cosmopolitan
constitution."6 With its fundamental principle of non-appropriation,
space law may provide a model which may one day make Kant's
vision a reality. Irrespective of the current political makeup of Earth,
we have much to learn from space law and its aims of promoting
global unity and peace.
An international response to the possibility of space travel
during the post-war era produced the current regime governing outer
space. The BogotAi 8 challenged this regime's prohibition on the
appropriation of outer space, but space law has thus far stood the test
of time. The Moon Agreement's precept of a common heritage of
humankind may have gone too far to gain acceptance in a world
composed of independent and self-interested sovereign countries, but
the growing interdependence of all countries may pave the way for
widespread international acceptance of such a forward-thinking
precept in the future. This emerging issue will take years to resolve,
and will require a degree of openness to change. As space historian
Robert Zimmerman has written, "[j]ust as the colonial movement
dominated much of 19th century politics and history, the growing
162. See NASA, International Space Station, available at http://www.nasa.gov/mission
pages /station/main/index.html
163. Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has alluded that the transfer of
national power from European countries to the supranational European Union is a sign
that the Westphalian model of sovereignty is eroding. See Joschka Fischer, German
Foreign Minister, From Confederacy to Federation-Thoughts on the Finality of
European Integration, Address at Humboldt University, Berlin (May 12, 2000) (transcript
available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/00/joschka-fischer en.rtf.).
164. IMMANUEL KANT, To PERPETUAL PEACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH 16, (Ted
Humphrey, trans., Cambridge, Hackett 2003).
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desire by nations today to settle and control the solar system is also
likely to dominate human history for centuries to come.""'
165. Robert Zimmerman, The New Colonial Movement, UPI (May 11, 2005)
http://behindtheblack.com/space-watch/the-new-colonial-movement.
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